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A LIVELY debate has been in progress in recent years as to
whether any distinct doctrine of assumption of risk exists. This
debate occupied a full morning at the annual meeting of the Ameri-
can Law Institute in May, 1963, and of course it has not been termi-
nated by the Institute's resolutions granting some measure of recog-
nition to the doctrine.1 In these circumstances, one who proposes to
write about assumption of risk, in products liability cases or any
other area of tort law, faces the burden of proving that his subject is
not illusory. Perhaps one can meet that burden with greater ease,
however, after-rather than before-examining concrete illustra-
tions of what some of us choose to call applications of assumption of
risk, either under that name or under the alias, volenti non fit injuria.,
This Article focuses on such illustrations in products liability cases;
the principles considered, however, seem equally applicable to other
areas of tort law.
II. EXPLICIT AGREEMENTS FOR ASSUMPTION OF RISK BY
PRODUCTS USERS
A. A Current Illustration In Automobile Marketing
In the purchase of a new car, the purchaser signs a document that
includes a so-called manufacturer's warranty. Aphorisms about the
fine print in insurance policies originated before automobiles were
* This Article is adapted from a lecture delivered at the Institute on Personal Injury
Litigation, Southwestern Legal Foundation, Dallas, Texas, on November 5, 1964. The writer
gratefully acknowledges the valuable research assistance of Richard A. Block, Harvard Law
School Class of 1965.
** B.B.A., LL.B., University of Texas; S.J.D., Harvard; Professor of Law, Harvard.
140 ALI Proceedings 367-76, 396-467 (1963). See also Restatement (Second), Torts
5 496A (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1963).
'It has often been said that there is no substantive difference between assumption of risk
and volenti non fit injuria, although as a matter of customary terminology in some courts
assumption of risk applies only in employer-employee cases or only in cases of contractual
relationships, whereas the volenti doctrine applies to other situations. E.g., Terry v. Boss
Hotels, Inc., 376 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1964) (plaintiff slipped and fell on dance floor, which
he admitted he realized was too heavily waxed; proper to submit the defense to the jury);
Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, Inc., 150 Tex. 191, 238 S.W.2d 172 (1951) (inspector killed
when pipe burst during tests; defense failed for want of showing full appreciation of risk).
Long preservation of a distinction in terminology, however, is bound to invite explanations
that there really is a difference. No distinction is made between the two in this Article. It
will be well if courts continue to resist the temptation to give different substantive or pro-
cedural effects to these two theories of what is in essence one and the same defense.
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invented-and before astute lawyers put their minds to drafting
automobile manufacturers' warranties. Typically these warranties,
rather than merely taking away something the bold print seems to
grant, take away something the buyer would have if there were no
bold print at all. Automobile dealers have commonly been instructed
by manufacturers that they must deliver the warranty, obtaining the
buyer's signature on a contract including it, whether the buyer wants
it or not. The warranty includes an agreement that, from the point
of view of the manufacturer, is an explicit disclaimer of liability
beyond that specified in the purchase contract. From the point of
view of the purchaser, it is an explicit assumption of risks of acci-
dental harm from the product, other than those specified. Until quite
recently the specified liability was mostly for replacement of parts
for a limited period of time. The warranties have since been liber-
alized, but in general they still do not purport to confer liability for
harm caused by defects, as distinguished from liability for the cost
of correcting a defect itself. The early precedents in automobile cases
upheld and enforced these exculpatory provisions, applying the gen-
eral rule that an agreement exonerating one of the parties or limiting
his liability to another party to the agreement is effective between
themselves!
B. Who Is Affected By Exculpatory Clauses?
It is well settled that exculpatory agreements are binding on only
the parties or their privies.! It is for this reason that automobile manu-
facturers insist that their warranty be made a part of the purchase
contract between the buyer and the dealer. Through this device, the
manufacturer seeks to establish a relationship of privity with the
aE.g., Shafer v. Reo Motors, Inc., 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1953) (sale of new car with
defective gasoline tank, the contract reading "this Warranty being expressly in lieu of all
other Warranties expressed or implied"); Nichols v. Hitchcock Motor Co., 22 Cal. App. 2d
151, 70 P.2d 654 (Dist. Ct. App. 1937) (clause in purchase contract saying purchaser as-
sumes full responsibility for any damage while seller's employee is driving vehicle); Getzoff
v. Von Lengerke Buick Co., 14 N.J. Misc. 750, 187 At. 539 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (suit based on
defect in new Pontiac barred by disclaimer in conditional sales contract) ; Sonnenberg v.
Nolan Motors, Inc., 2 Misc. 2d 185, 36 N.Y.S.2d 549 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (buyer of new Dodge
by contract waived any implied warranty made part of contract by New York statute). But
see Ford Motor Co. v. Cullum, 96 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 627 (1938)
(warranty limited to replacement of parts; rescission of purchase contract under Uniform
Sales Act allowed when new parts supplied did not remedy defects).
" Dockens v. La Caze, 78 F. Supp. 515 (W.D. La. 1948) (provision in employment con-
tract that employee should be solely liable for any injuries he inflicted upon others; held
not binding on injured third person). See also I Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability §
16.04 [2] [e] (1964); 2 Harper & James, Torts § 28.25 n.13 (1956): "Where the effect of
a warranty is extended by reason of the maker's advertising addressed to the general public,
a disclaimer of warranty clearly expressed in the same advertising should perhaps be given
equally broad effect. But where the disclaimer is in the documents of sale between the maker
and his vendee, it should not bind remote vendees."
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buyer. This is the converse of situations in which the manufacturer
denies privity and the claimant seeks to establish it in order to sup-
port a theory of liability on implied warranty or negligence. That
war has been won by claimants;' only mopping-up operations remain.
It has now become more useful to manufacturers to embrace privity
and supplement it with exculpatory agreements.
C. Decisional Limitations On Validity
From the first there have been some limitations on the effectiveness
of exculpatory agreements-limitations in the form of rules of con-
struction disfavoring exculpation from liability for negligence." Re-
cently, more rigorous limitations have been emerging in the prece-
dents. For example, consider Hunter v. American Rentals, Inc.' This
was an action for personal injuries and property damage sustained by
the plaintiff when a trailer rented to him by defendant and attached
to his automobile came loose at the hitch but remained attached with
a safety chain in such a manner that, swinging from one side of the
highway to the other, it caused plaintiff's automobile to overturn.
The rental agreement purported to absolve defendant of all responsi-
bility. By its terms plaintiff waived all claims, "including those re-
sulting from defects, latent or apparent."' A statute of the state
required that the hitch connecting one vehicle and another as its
tow "shall be of sufficient strength to pull, stop and hold all weight
towed thereby" and that "an adequate safety hitch" shall also be
provided.' The court denied a defense based on the exculpatory con-
tractual provisions, holding that those provisions were void as "being
in contravention of the statute and the public policy of this state.""
The matter was discussed as one of enforceability of a contractual
provision, rather than in terms of assumption of risk. But from
another point of view this was a holding that a purported express
assumption of risk was ineffectual because contrary to a statute and
the public policy of the state.
'E.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (auto-
mobile); Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, 322 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963) (automobile), noted in
18 Sw. L.J. 128 (1964).
'E.g., Grey v. Hayes-Sammons Chem. Co., 310 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1962) (disclaimer
must clearly describe warranties it is disclaiming); Aerial Agricultural Serv. v. Richard, 264
F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1959) (terms of exculpatory agreement must have been brought home
to plaintiff and must apply to the particular negligence); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Chicago
Packaged Fuel Co., 195 F.2d 467 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 832 (1952) (contracts
exculpating from liability for future negligence will be strictly construed against the party
relying thereon).
'189 Kan. 615, 371 P.2d 131 (1962).
'Id. at 616, 371 P.2d at 132.
'Id. at 617, 371 P.2d at 133.
'OId. at 619, 371 P.2d at 134.
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Nor is this holding unique. A similar result was reached in Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc." An automobile dealer sold a
car to Henningsen under a written purchase contract containing
the standard automobile manufacturer's warranty-an exculpatory
clause. Henningsen's wife was injured when the car went out of
control after being driven only a few hundred miles. It was found
that the accident was caused by a defect in the steering mechanism.
The court held that an implied warranty of merchantability from
both manufacturer and dealer extended to the purchaser and his wife
(with intimations it would extend to anyone else foreseeably injured).
The exculpatory provisions of the written agreement were held
unenforceable because against public policy.
To date, there is only a scattering of cases holding exculpatory
clauses unenforceable, but it seems evident that this is the trend. We
can expect it to be extended rapidly to other jurisdictions and to
other transactions in which the form of the contract is dictated by
the bargaining power and position of one of the parties.
Consider an illustration of express assumption of risk in another
kind of case, Jefferson County Bank v. Armored Motors Serv."
Plaintiff bank delivered bags of currency to defendant for transmis-
sion to another bank. After depositing the bags in their truck and
locking it, defendant's guards went back into plaintiff bank to deliver
bags of silver. On their return they discovered that four bags of
currency had been taken by unknown persons, the loss amounting to
about $165,000. Rates charged for defendant's armored-car service
were graduated in ratio to the maximum liability to the customer on
each shipment. Plaintiff bank had paid thirty-five dollars per month
for ten round-trip pickups; and, under the terms of the contract,
$30,000 was defendant's maximum liability per shipment at that rate.
The contract was held enforceable. The court spoke of this arrange-
ment not as an assumption of risk but as an enforceable contract to
limit one's liability for negligence. This is what one says when look-
ing at the transaction through the eyes of the negligent party. The
transaction is also what one refers to, looking at it through the eyes
of the victim, as express assumption of risk.
One's instinctive reaction about the rough-and-ready justice of
that fact situation is, no doubt, consistent with the court's enforce-
ment of the contract; probably that is so even if one customarily
represents bankers rather than people who operate armored cars-on
either side of the law. Note the contrast between this case, on the one
1132 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).12 148 Coao. 343, 366 P.2d 134 (1961).
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hand, and Henningsen and Hunter on the other. In this bank case,
one might say there was no disparity of bargaining positions in the
first place. Even if there may have been such a disparity, however,
the party drawing the form contract gave the other party a clear
option-pay one price and assume the risk of loss from negligence
of the armored-car service above $30,000 per delivery or pay a
higher price and leave that risk upon the armored-car service, where
tort law places it in the absence of a valid exculpatory agreement.
That kind of arrangement seems very fair, and it will surely continue
to be enforceable even where the trend toward striking down ex-
culpatory agreements has taken effect. Thus, lawyers who are em-
ployed to draft exculpatory clauses would do well to consider pro-
posing a two-price option-one price with exculpation, and a higher
price without. That kind of solution has evolved with respect to
common carriers' efforts to limit their liability,"3 and a similar solu-
tion regarding exculpatory contracts in other contexts seems likely.
III. "As Is" SALES AND UNILATERAL DISCLAIMERS
In a sense, one seeks to invoke an analogy to a two-price option
when he attempts to make an "as is" sale. In Pokrajac v. Wade Motors,
Inc.,4 for example, a used car with defective brakes was offered "as
is"-and no doubt at a price that compared favorably with the price
demanded for an ordinary sale. The court upheld the implicit agree-
ment of exculpation, declaring that the purchaser had assumed the
risk. The court noted," however, that a different question is involved
if, as in Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., the claimant is a third person
(not a party to the contract) who is injured by use of the defective
vehicle before the brakes have been repaired.
Another kind of three-party problem arises when the manufac-
turer of a product attempts a unilateral disclaimer. In a way, calling
such a disclaimer unilateral is misleading. What the manufacturer
hopes to accomplish is so to bring the disclaimer to the attention of
the purchaser that it must be said that the purchaser bought with
notice (and that any user other than the purchaser used with notice)
and is not a third party in the sense of being a stranger to the dis-
claimer. Ordinarily, as indicated in Taylor v. Jacobson,"' such a dis-
"3 Union Pac. R.R. v. Burke, 255 U.S. 317 (1921) (rail carrier failed to give choice of
rates and limitation held invalid); Holmes v. National Van Lines, Inc., 55 Wash. 2d 861,
350 P.2d 864 (1960) (motor carrier gave choice of rates and limitation held valid). See
also Annot., 165 A.L.R. 1005 (1946).
14266 Wis. 398, 63 N.W.2d 720 (1954).
"5Id. at 401, 63 N.W.2d at 722.
,a 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928).
'1 336 Mass. 709, 147 N.E.2d 770 (1958).
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claimer is a good defense for a retailer as well as a manufacturer if
there is proof of its being brought to the attention of the purchaser
and the user. If brought to the purchaser's attention before purchase,
perhaps it may be regarded as part of an explicit assumption of risk.
If brought to his attention only afterwards, however, no contract for
assumption of risk can be made out. In that situation, the defense is
more closely related to what is commonly called implied assumption
of risk-a defense based on voluntary exposure to recognized risk.
IV. VOLUNTARY ExPOSURE TO RECOGNIZED RISK
A. Recognition As A Defense
What is the legal result if a person recognizes the existence of risks
created by negligence of another, but nevertheless goes forward vol-
untarily with conduct exposing himself to those risks and suffers
injury within their scope? A defense based on such facts has been
upheld in a number of cases.'" The essence of this defense is voluntary
exposure to recognized risk.
This problem is well illustrated by Halepeska v. Callihan Interests,
Inc." This was a wrongful death action against a gas well owner.
The well blew out while Halepeska was working on it, causing his
death. Plaintiffs contended that the well was negligently equipped.
In response to special issues, the jury made two groups of findings:
(1) that in the exercise of ordinary care Halepeska should have had
full knowledge of the manner in which the wells were equipped, that
he should have appreciated the danger of opening the valves that
were opened, and that he voluntarily exposed himself to such danger,
which in the exercise of ordinary care he should have known and
appreciated; and (2) that Halepeska did not have full knowledge of
the manner in which the wells were equipped and did not appreciate
the extent of the danger involved in opening the valves. On the basis
of the first group of findings, and treating the second group as not
controlling, the court of civil appeals rendered judgment for the
defendant on the theory of volenti non fit injuria."' The Supreme
8E.g., Satter v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 186 Cal. App. 2d 248, 8 Cal. Rptr. 747
(Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (hearing denied by Cal. Sup. Ct. with two justices dissenting) (con-
tinued driving of defective motorcycle); Gallegos v. Nash, San Francisco, 137 Cal. App. 2d
14, 289 P.2d 835 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955) (continued driving of car with spongy brakes);
Sanders v. Kalamazoo Tank & Silo Co., 205 Mich. 339, 171 N.W. 523 (1919) (use of
,derrick with knowledge it had not been assembled according to manufacturer's instructions);
Runnels v. Dixie Drive-It-Yourself Sys., 220 Miss. 678, 71 So. 2d 453 (1954) (continued
driving of rented car that shimmied). See also Restatement (Second), Torts § 496A (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1963), and cases cited in note 23 infra.
'9 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963).
"Callihan Interests, Inc. v. Halepeska, 349 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
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Court of Texas held that, because of the finding that Halepeska did
not have full knowledge and appreciation of the risk arising from
the defendant's negligence in improperly equipping the well, no de-
fense based on voluntarily encountering known danger could be
sustained. This resulted in a remand to the intermediate court for
consideration of other contentions that might require reversal and
remand to the trial court for new trial.-'
B. The Restatement Controversy And Its Practical Implications
The Halepeska case presented to Justice Greenhill of the Supreme
Court of Texas an ideal opportunity to invoke the arguments pre-
sented before the American Law Institute in May, 1963, concerning
assumption of risk. Justice Greenhill capitalized on the opportunity
with an opinion that reports the opposing views expressed before the
ALI and skillfully traces in Texas cases colossal support for both of
the opposing views.
Perhaps the controversy before the ALl is best introduced by
stating a point not in dispute. It was agreed on all hands, as it was
assumed by the court in the Halepeska case, that in some situations,
even though the defendant unreasonably created a risk, he is entitled
to judgment upon a finding that the plaintiff voluntarily exposed
himself to the risk with full appreciation of it. Observe that this
statement is so framed as not to speak of either the concept of assump-
tion of risk or the concept of no duty.
The first point of controversy is simply a controversy over termi-
nology. In the preceding paragraph the substantive proposition is
expressed in a way acceptable, surely, to most representatives of both
factions. It may also be expressed, however, in two other ways. (1)
In some situations, even though the defendant unreasonably created
a risk, he is entitled to judgment upon a finding that the plaintiff
voluntarily exposed himself to the risk with full appreciation of it
because plaintiff thus assumed the risk. This is, in effect, the way the
Restatement of Torts (Second)"' expresses the proposition, and it is
also the form of expression more commonly used in judicial opinions
over the country." (2) In some situations, even though the de-
fendant unreasonably created a risk, he is entitled to judgment upon
2s 371 S.W.2d at 386.
22 Restatement (Second), Torts § 496A (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1963).
2' Cases sustaining a defense of assumed risk are cited in note 18 supra. See also the fol-
lowing cases dealing with the problem under this terminology, though denying the defense
on the facts: Valmas Drug Co. v. Smoots, 269 Fed. 336 (6th Cir. 1920) (eyewash tablets);
McCormick v. Lowe & Campbell Athletic Goods Co., 235 Mo. App. 653, 144 S.W.2d 866
(1940) (vaulting pole); Swaney v. Peden Steel Co., 259 N.C. 531, 131 S.E.2d 601 (1963)
(steel truss broke when bolts sheared).
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a finding that the plaintiff voluntarily exposed himself to the risk
with full appreciation of it, because the defendant owed such a plain-
tiff no duty of care. This is, in effect, the no-duty formulation.
In short, the controversy over terminology is that one group
prefers to say no liability because of assumption of risk in these cases
of voluntary exposure to fully appreciated risk, and the other group
prefers to say no liability because of no duty. If we must choose
between these methods of expression, the former seems preferable,
not merely because it is consistent with the usage in more judicial
opinions than is the other, but also because it is less misleading. The
no-duty usage produces two bizarre effects. For illustration of these
effects, assume a case just like Halepeska except in one respect-that
there was also another worker beside Halepeska, and this second
worker did know and appreciate the risk. Under the no-duty usage,
one says that the single course of conduct of the defendant in failing
properly to equip its wells was negligence as to Halepeska but was
not negligence as to the other worker toward whom there was no
duty of care. The only difference is not in the quality of the de-
fendant's conduct but rather in the quality of the plaintiffs' partici-
pation in the event. Talking about this one difference as a duty or
no-duty proposition is confusing. Duty and no duty connote some-
thing about the defendant's conduct or the relation between the
plaintiff and the defendant rather than something about the plain-
tiff's participation. Assumption of risk, on the other hand, connotes
something about the plaintiff's participation, and since this is the
point of distinction, use of this term seems the preferable way of
saying it.
The second bizarre effect of the no-duty terminology is related to
the fact that the defendant's conduct, equipping the well, occurs
long before we or the defendant could know whether Halepeska and
the other worker would discover the risk. Ordinarily we are accus-
tomed to judging conduct as of the time and place it occurs, but
under this usage the question whether the defendant's unreason-
able conduct was negligence can only be decided as of a time when
it is known whether the worker discovered the risk. And this judg-
ment must be made separately in relation to each worker. Not
illogical. Just misleading to anyone whose alertness to the special
usage lapses even momentarily.
This much, as already indicated, seems merely a matter of termi-
nology. It may be important, because our terminology tends to rule
or to confuse us sometimes. Nevertheless, we can rule if we master
the terminology, so it need not necessarily result in any substantive
[Vol. 19:61
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difference. Most judicial opinions speak either exclusively or pri-
marily in the assumption-of-risk terminology. A few recent opin-
ions have spoken exclusively in the no-duty terminology." And in
some jurisdictions cases using each manner of speaking alone and
other cases using both manners of speaking can be found.' Hopes for
a uniform manner of speaking seem dim, so it is well to be bilingual-
to be able to understand, perhaps even to speak and write, both
languages.
Also, probably there is a bit more to this controversy than just the
matter of terminology. The noncontroversial proposition stated pre-
viously, without use of either no-duty or assumption-of-risk con-
cepts, was subject to a qualification-in some situations, even though
the defendant unreasonably created a risk, he is entitled to judgment
upon a finding that the plaintiff voluntarily exposed himself to the
risk with full appreciation of it. Probably it is fair to say that the
proponents of the no-duty terminology are usually also proponents
of the proposition that prudent voluntary exposure to a fully ap-
preciated risk ought not to defeat liability. They argue that although
under the precedents such a way of defeating liability is available in
some situations, the better path of the future is to recognize duty
and liability despite a voluntary exposure that is reasonable and,
therefore, not contributory negligence. In general that point of view
seems sound in relation to cases of the hard-choice type to which
reference will be made below." For example, it should not be enough
to escape liability that the defendant warns of danger and the plain-
tiff understands the warning, if the defendant's conduct has never-
theless created a situation in which he can foresee, if viewing the
circumstances reasonably, that the hard choice he has presented to the
plaintiff will cause the latter to chance the danger when that is a
reasonable thing to do. No doubt proponents of this view can gain
ground if they can persuade us all to use their terminology, for the
plaintiff's voluntary exposure seems little reason to say the defendant
has no duty of care; this remains true even if one thinks that volun-
tary exposure ought to be a good defense on some other theory. In
short, the objective of this group is a good one, but their way of
working for its accomplishment leads to confusion.
'
4 Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959), is an
examp e, and a passage in that opinion illustrates the confusion that can result from the
terminology. See Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 La. L. Rev.
122, 160-64 (1961).
"a Texas is an example. The cases are classified from this point of view in Justice Green-
hill's opinion in Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963).
See text accompanying notes 29-33 infra.
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C. New Limits On The Scope Of The Defense-
Some Arguments Of Policy
Over the years, many of the opinions on assumption of risk have
included language in the terms of the first group of jury findings in
Halepeska-that is, statements that the plaintiff should have ap-
preciated the risk, or that he voluntarily exposed himself to a danger
that in the exercise of ordinary care he would have appreciated.
Enough of this remains in the precedents to make plausible, and per-
haps even tenable in some jurisdictions, an argument for assumption
of risk on an objective standard (i.e., should have known and
appreciated) rather than a subjective standard (i.e., did know and
appreciate). This, incidentally, was the substantive point at issue in
Halepeska. That decision, consistently with the prevailing view,
which is also adopted in the Restatement, limits the defense to cases
of subjective appreciation of risk with one possible exception. That is,
there remains a tendency to say that if the danger is open and
obvious, one will not be heard to say he did not appreciate it. If that
is only a delicate way of saying to the claimant that his story is a
pack of lies or that no jury could reasonably find that he did not
appreciate the risk in fact, regardless of what he says, it is consistent
with the limitation of assumption of risk to the cases of subjective
assumption of risk.
The court's opinion in Halepeska is a distinct service to lawyers
and the law in clarifying the no-duty, assumption-of-risk and volenti
doctrines in Texas. Another more recent opinion of Justice Greenhill
has contributed further clarification, and improvement as well. The
case is Wesson v. Gillespie." Perhaps there is an element of poetic
propriety in the fact that this assumption-of-risk case arose out of
an incident at the Eight-Ball Bar. In leaving the establishment, the
plaintiff tripped on the threshold and fell outside onto a concrete
apron. Despite jury findings favorable to the plaintiff, the trial court
entered judgment for the defendant. The supreme court affirmed the
trial court, reversing the contrary decision of the court of civil
appeals.28 In ruling that under the evidence the condition of the
threshold was open and obvious and plaintiff assumed the risk as a
matter of law, the court moves far toward establishing an objective
standard for what is open and obvious. Unmistakably, however, the
court is requiring more than merely proof that the plaintiff should
have appreciated the danger. Though the standard may be objective
in some degree, it is not a standard concerned merely with whether
17 382 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. 1964).
2Gillespie v. Wesson, 370 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
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a reasonable person would have appreciated the danger. A consider-
ably stronger showing than that is required.
The fact findings in Halepeska relieved the court of the necessity
of facing a difficult question of substance that would have been pre-
sented if there had been a finding that Halepeska knew and appreci-
ated the risk fully but was reasonable in exposing himself to it. Why
should a negligent defendant be allowed to escape liability because
the plaintiff chose to expose himself to the risk negligently created
by the defendant, if the plaintiff's choice was reasonable? Should we
not instead say that the defendant's negligence unfairly confronted
plaintiff with a hard choice in which exposure to defendant's negli-
gently created risk seemed the lesser evil and that, therefore, the
defendant should be liable? 9
There is a very close analogy between this argument and the argu-
ment in cases like Hunter"° and Henningsen' that the exculpatory
agreement was contrary to public policy. Just as we are witnessing
an increasing number of decisions striking down exculpatory express
assumptions of risk as contrary to public policy, so also an increasing
number of decisions strike down the subtler form of defense. Two
recent decisions are particularly noteworthy.
In Siragusa v. Swedish Hosp.,32 a nurse's aid sued her employer
for injuries sustained while at work. As she was standing at the wash
basin in a six-patient ward, a patient in a wheelchair pushed the ward
door inward. On the door was a metal hook placed there to permit
persons to open the door from the inside with a forearm. This hook
struck the upper part of plaintiff's back. Plaintiff contended that
defendant was negligent in failing to provide her a safe place to
work, and the trial court dismissed at the close of the evidence on
the ground that plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk. The Supreme
Court of Washington, without benefit of any applicable statute and
overruling its own earlier decisions, held that assumption of risk is
no longer a defense in employer-employee cases. The direct impact of
this decision may not be great, since there are relatively few employer-
employee cases not governed by statute. But its potential significance
is far greater, because most of what was said about the injustice of
2See Clayards v. Dethick, 12 Q.B. 439, 116 Eng. Rep. 932 (1848) (plaintiff's horse
strangled after falling in excavation blocking access to stables); Central R.R. v. Crosby,
74 Ga. 737 (1885) (engineer killed when he stayed in cab to try to lossen effects of colli-
sion); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. McLean, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 130, 118 S.W. 161 (1909)
error ref. (alternative of using defective railway cars or losing cabbages from nonshipment).
See also 2 Harper & James, Torts, § 21.1 (1956); Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products
Liability Cases, 22 La. L. Rev. 122, 154-59 (1961).
soHunter v. American Rentals, Inc., 189 Kan. 615, 371 P.2d 131 (1962).
3'Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
. 60 Wash. 2d 310, 373 P.2d 767 (1962).
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allowing the negligent employer a defense of assumption of risk when
the voluntary exposure was reasonable is also applicable in other
relationships generally.
McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." is another decision
pointing the same way. In that case the Wisconsin court, overruling
precedents, declared that assumption of risk is no longer a part of
automobile law in that jurisdiction.
In both these instances it is the substantive doctrine, concerned
with voluntary exposure to fully appreciated risk, that is being aban-
doned. If a defendant argues for no duty, rather than for assumption
of risk, he will encounter the same response. The theory of nonlia-
bility because of voluntary exposure to fully appreciated risk has
been rejected, and it matters not what terminology one uses in trying
to urge it.
V. ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
In Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.," plaintiff sued the re-
tailer and the manufacturer of a combination power tool known as
a "Shopsmith." It could be used as a saw, drill and wood lathe. And
it turned out to be even more versatile. The language of the New
York court, when it was subsequently describing the Greenman case,
conjures up visions of a revolt of machines against their masters. This
machine, said the New York court, "threw a piece of wood at a
user.""5 The California court, in the opinion deciding the case, per-
sonified the wood rather than the machine. As they put it, a piece
of wood the user wished to make into a chalice "suddenly flew out
of the machine and struck him on the forehead, inflicting serious
injuries."'" The California court, imposing liability on the manu-
facturer of the Shopsmith for the injuries suffered by the user, made
clear that in its view the liability of the manufacturer to the con-
sumer is governed not "by the law of contract warranties but by the
law of strict liability in tort."'" "The purpose of such liability,"
observed the court, "is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put
such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who
are powerless to protect themselves....
315 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962).
34 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963), noted in 17 Sw. L.J. 669 (1963).
"Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83
(1963) (suit against air carrier and manufacturers of altimeter and airplane involved in
airplane crash).
T4 59 Cal. 2d at 59, 377 P.2d at 898.
"Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901.
3s Ibid.
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In a way, it may appear that the other major hurdle in the case-
whether strict liability is to be extended beyond food products to
products generally-is passed over rather lightly. The opinion simply
says: "Recognized first in the case of unwholesome food products,
such liability has now been extended to a variety of other products
that create as great or greater hazards if defective."3" The illustrations
cited by the court include, among others, cases of a defective grind-
ing wheel," soft-drink bottles, 1 insect spray, 2 a surgical pin, 3 auto-
mobiles," home permanent, 45 hair dye," and an airplane.47 The opin-
ion concludes: "To establish the manufacturer's liability it was suffi-
cient that plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the Shop-
smith in a way it was intended to be used as a result of a defect in
design and manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware that made
the Shopsmith unsafe for its intended use.'
8
Note two points. First, the court's conclusion is qualified by the
inclusion of the condition that the plaintiff was not aware of the
defect. Thus, the court is free to say that voluntary exposure to a
known defect bars a claimant, either on a theory of no duty or on
a theory of assumption of risk. Second, the conclusion is qualified by
the condition that the injury resulted from a defect in the product-
in design and manufacture. It may be argued that the principle of
placing the burden of injuries on the maker of the product should
apply to injuries from expectable use of even a product without
defect. But that is a debatable step, and one this court has not taken.
Although in Greenman the theory of liability approved by the
court involved a showing of defect in the product, the opinion did
not discuss what constitutes a defect. Other cases have begun to
develop this concept of defect. Casagrande "v. F.W. Woolworth
Co.4 is an example. The plaintiff suffered from dermatitis after ap-
plications of a deodorant purchased from the defendant. The de-
fense was successful on the ground that the plaintiff failed to meet
her burden of showing that the product was unfit-"that is, that it
'lid. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900.
4°Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d 575 (1960).
41 Vallis v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 2d 35, 11 Cal. Rptr. 823 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1961); Jones v. Burgermeister Brewing Corp., 198 Cal. App. 2d 198, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 311 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
42 McQuaide v. Bridegport Brass Co., 190 F. Supp. 252 (D. Conn. 1960).
43Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960).
"E.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
4a Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958).
46Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954).
7 Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
4Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901 (1963),
noted in 17 Sw. L.J. 669 (1963).
40 340 Mass. 552, 165 N.E.2d 109 (1960). See generally P. Keeton, Products Liability-
Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 Texas L. Rev. 855 (1963).
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would have sensitized [and injured] a significant number of per-
sons . . . either immediately or after a period of use.""0 In short, the
defect-the aberration-may have been in the plaintiff's skin rather
than the defendant's product. There is also a sprinkling of cases
determining whether a chicken sandwich is defective if it has chicken
bones in it," and whether oyster stew is defective if containing a
piece of oyster shell."
This question of defect is also one of the many problems in the
cigarette-cancer cases. In Lartigue the Fifth Circuit adopted the
position, applying their best estimate of Louisiana law, that for
liability to be imposed the product "must be unreasonably dangerous
to the ordinary consumer, with knowledge common to the com-
munity as to its characterization."" Sugar is not defective, even
though unwholesome for diabetics; whiskey is not defective, even
though dangerous to alcoholics." And proof that cigarettes con-
tribute to cancer does not necessarily establish that they are defective
or unwholesome in the sense required for strict liability. The court
affirmed a general verdict for the defendants, stating in the process
that a manufacturer of "cigarettes is strictly liable for foreseeable
harm resulting from a defective condition in the product when the
consumer uses the product for the purposes for which it was manu-
factured and marketed."'"
There is a most interesting relationship between the question
whether a product is defective and the question whether plaintiff's
recovery for harm caused by use of the product will be barred if
he voluntarily exposed himself to a recognized risk from its use, from
which injury resulted. A hypothetical case will illustrate the point.
Defendant markets a drug with wondrous properties for curing one
illness and causing another. Suppose, for example, it is a drug that
causes no substantial ill effects except in pregnant women. If mar-
keted in a package that contains maximum warning of its ill effects
in a limited class of cases, is the drug defective? Is the manufacturer
liable if through a mistake by a doctor or druggist or patient, it is
sold. at 556, 165 N.E.2d at 112.
"' E.g., Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960) (complaint
stated cause of action; test of "reasonable expectation" approved and test of "natural"
versus "foreign" substance disapproved).
'Bonenberger v. Pittsburg Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d 913 (1942) (jury
question). But cf. Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167 (1960) (a plate of
fried oysters was not unfit because containing a piece of oyster shell; 4-3 decision).
"
5 Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 37 (5th Cir. 1963), cerl. de-
nied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963).
"Ibid., citing Goodrich, C. J., in Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d
292, 302 (3d Cir. 1962).
6 317 F,2d at 39.
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used by a pregnant woman? If so, is there liability even in case it is
used by a pregnant woman who has read the warning on the package?
Probably not. Indeed, this is not even a case of the type in which the
defendant's conduct imposes upon the plaintiff a hard choice-the
type of case in which, it has been suggested above," a plaintiff's
choice to encounter the risk ought not to bar his claim if the choice
was reasonable, even though he fully understood the risk. One pos-
sible explanation of the result of nonliability in this hypothetical case
is that the product was not defective. Another explanation is that
the plaintiff, who read and understood the warning on the package
and nevertheless chose to use the drug, assumed the risk. It is an
explanation courts are likely to voice, despite sharp criticism of the
doctrine of assumption of risk. And even if in this context it is a
second reason for a result that could be reached on another ground
alone, it strikes a responsive chord and fortifies the argument that
the requirement of a defect is an appropriate limitation on the scope
of the emerging rule of strict products liability.
"See text accompanying notes 29-33 supra.
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